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HUNDRED YEARS SINCE YUGOSLAVIA'S BIRTH: LESSON ON 
NATIONALISM, BALKANIZATION AND RELIGION IN EUROPE'S 
PERIPHERY1 
 
 By Vjekoslav Perica 
 
Vjekoslav Perica is a Croatian-American historian based in Baltimore, Maryland. Since 2006 
Perica has held Professorship in History at the University of Rijeka, Croatia. He is the author of 
scholarly books and articles, including Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav 
States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; a revised 2-volume edition in Serbian, 
Belgrade, Biblioteka XX vek, 2006) and Heavenly Yugoslavia. Interactions between Political 
Culture and Political Mythologies, coauthored with Mitja Velikonja (Belgrade: xx vek). 
Translations of Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States are upcoming this 
year in South Korea and Poland. His article-chapter “Jerusalem Balkanized: The Kosovo 
Controversy and Balkan-Mideast Parallels, 1985-2018,” will be published in Nadim Rouhana 
and Nadera Shaloub-Kavorkian, eds., When Politics are Sacralized: International Comparative 
Perspectives on Religious Claims and Nationalism, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2019). 
 
                                                          
1 This lengthy foreword serves as a chapter that completes the concluding picture from the original version of 
Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Thus the 
Korean translation of Balkan Idols is not just going to be a linguistic interpretation but supplement to an ongoing 
research on the new public, globalizing religions and the de-secularized nationalisms in our time. Although Balkan 
Idols has been hitherto translated in several languages, what further makes the Korean edition special is the global 
comparative perspective under which the story from the distant Balkans will be read and reconsidered. While it 
seems too bold to compare historical experiences of the peoples in the Balkan and Korean peninsulas, there is at 
least the widely known common experience of imperialism, tragic fratricidal wars, partitions and invented enmities 
among kin peoples living side by side for centuries. Regarding the role of religion in recent history, during my 
Balkan research trips, I have met devout Korean Catholics visiting what is now globally popular pilgrimage 
destination of Medjugorje in Herzegovina. While their religious experience does not require profound knowledge 
and critical thinking about the interaction of religion and nationalism in the Balkans, Korean researchers will benefit 
from the critical approach to these topics. It is fortunate that Balkan religions have sparked the interest of Korean 
academics. I am therefore deeply grateful to Dr. Chung Keunjae from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, 
Korea, for the translation of Balkan Idols to the Korean language. Thanks to Dr. Chung’s translation of Balkan 
Idols, I am now hoping that both regions’ knowledge and culture will benefit from this book as a contribution to 
these recent Balkan-Korea global encounters and exchanges of knowledge.  I am also grateful to Dr. Snježana Zorić 
at Hankuk University’s Global Campus for facilitating the communication between Croatia and Korea and making 
this text better with comments as suggestions for which I also would like to thank Dr. Mila Dragojević of Sewanee 
University, USA. 
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In 2018, historians were marking the one hundredth anniversary of the foundation of a 
nation-state in southeastern Europe remembered as Yugoslavia–the country of Southern Slavs. 
The multi-ethnic nation used to connect several European ethnic groups of the shared Slavonic 
ancestry yet were divided by three major religions and mutually exclusive ethnic nationalist 
ideologies. The Yugoslav national project lasted seven decades under various regime types in a 
sensitive balance often disturbed by wars. In the 20th century alone, the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia saw six major wars, three cycles of ethnic cleansing and genocide, and about fifteen 
various states and regimes, half of which have by now collapsed and disappeared from the map. 
In a wider historical perspective, this Europe’s periphery has left the lesson which world history 
curricula ought not to overlook: how the Southern Slavs united, rose out of obscurity and then 
ruined themselves. In addition to that lesson, another may be developing as the world order 
seems to be changing. The world today is not the same as that which was formed at the end of 
the Cold War. Since the state arrangements in the ex-Yugoslav space have always changed and 
restructured in response to major changes in international order, it is likely that the Balkans will 
go to war again, possibly, again, in the broader context of major regional or even world wars.  
As a result of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, a larger unified Yugoslav nation-state has 
been destroyed and replaced by seven smaller states. Each now claims a distinct nationhood and 
separate language, homogenizes the population ethnically and religiously within state borders, 
establishes a state religion, perpetuates mutually contesting interpretations of the common 
history, and invents numerous border crossings within the relatively small, interdependent, and 
naturally shared space. The dissolution cost 150,000 human lives, not counting twice as many 
people who have been crippled and traumatized for life. An additional several million have been 
forced out of their homes in the warring factions’ effort to break up multiethnic communities 
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aiming to create homogenous ethno-sectarian states. Headquartered at The Hague in the 
Netherlands, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held 10,800 
trial days, heard 4,650 witnesses, consulted 2.5 million pages of transcripts and passed 161 
indictments—most of which resulted in long prison sentences for war crimes, crimes of genocide 
and ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  
The causes of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the 20th century Balkans are not wild 
outbursts of ethnic or religious hatred as Western mass media used to speculate. Rather, genocide 
and ethnic cleansing are unavoidable maladies of ethnoreligious types of nationalism. Balkan 
genocides and ethnic cleansing campaigns in the 20th century were pre-planned methods for the 
restructuring diverse societies, which formed over many centuries into historically 
unprecedented ethnically and religiously homogenous states. The reason Yugoslavia was 
destroyed is not because it was communist and authoritarian in order to make it democratic. It 
was destroyed because it was a multiethnic nation-state in order to balkanize it into ethnically 
homogenous states most of which never sincerely wanted democracy. The Balkan ethnoreligious 
nationalist revolutions of the 1990s have destroyed a unique civilization. They aimed to 
annihilate the pluralistic social fabric consisting of culturally pluralistic communities, 
multiethnic cities, and millions of ethnically and religiously mixed marriages. They also targeted 
monuments, memorials, libraries, archeology, architecture, literature, history, and the memory of 
the common state and similarities among its former peoples. Portrayed by the new nationalist 
myths as the restoration of ethnic kingdoms originating in the Middle Ages, and therefore seen as 
“natural” versus the allegedly “artificial” Yugoslavia, the new states were historically 
unprecedented artificial constructs and hybrids of recent history. The novelty of the alleged “old 
nations” is evident from their new national ideologies that have mainly been constructed by the 
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historical revisionism of the Second World War, the Cold War, and the Balkan wars of the 
1990s.  
In the Balkans, legacies of imperial conquest left a heterogeneous population in a land 
where Eastern and Western Christianity overlap boundaries with each other and Islam. Over 
centuries there have emerged culturally diverse societies with the four common-language 
speaking Slavic ethnic nations; their close ethnic relatives are Slovenes, and several dozen ethnic 
minorities of which Albanians were the largest. In such a setting, no culturally homogenous 
ethnoreligious nation-state would be possible without tribal wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. 
Therefore, in the 19th century, positive ideologies of peaceful interethnic integration and 
cooperation as the path to development, national emancipation, and successful nation-building 
emerged. For nearly two hundred years these ideologies had been more influential than separatist 
ethnic nationalism, which came to the forefront only in extraordinary circumstances—such as the 
Nazi-fascist occupation in the Second World War when the invaders pitted the local groups 
against each other, and following the end of the Cold War and collapse of communism.  In the 
end, the turmoil of post-communism and the genocidal wars of the 1990s enabled ethno-sectarian 
nationalisms to defeat the idea of multiethnic integration, which is unlikely to ever re-emerge in 
the form of a unified statehood.  
Consequently, ethnic cleansing has been partly accomplished and war crimes paid off as 
a long-term investment. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a homogenous Serb sub-state (called Republika 
Srpska) has been created through ethnic cleansing and genocide. The Dayton Peace Accords of 
1995 legitimized it, which has largely satisfied the Serb nationalists’ war aims. Bosnian 
Muslims, once representing an indigenous European Islam bridging the East and West, began 
importing foreign brands of radical Islam from Iran and Saudi Arabia. In Croatia, after the 1991-
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1995 war, Croat nationalism emerged triumphant defeating a Serb separatist movement and 
forcing most of Croatia’s native Serbs out. Meanwhile, the new Croat nationalism has grown to 
rival Serbian nationalism, and the two continued to hold the whole region hostage to their mutual 
hostility. While their states force Serbs and Croats to differ from each other as much as possible, 
the common language under different labels continues to work well for all, as well as the two 
nation-states’ key similarities. These similarities include a church-state symbiosis and the type of 
nationalist mythology that commemorates lost battles. Finally, in the Western Balkans’ 
southeastern pocket, the Kosovo province, Serbs have made several attempts to ethnically 
cleanse the majority Albanians since the early 20th century. In the end, Kosovo Albanians have 
succeeded to expel almost all Serbs from the land which once was the Serbian medieval empire. 
Like most other post-Yugoslav states, the new state of Kosovo is largely a failure. The 
neighboring miniature Balkan states of Montenegro and Macedonia are in no better shape (the 
latter living 30 years without an official internationally recognized name and under threat of 
partition into a Slavic and Albanian state).  
In short, the Yugoslav fairy-tale from the golden age of the interethnic brotherhood and 
unity, socialist workers’ self-management, charismatic Titoism and non-alignment turned into a 
nightmare. Following Snow White’s death, the seven dwarfs lived unhappily ever after. Unable 
to keep their house neat and mine diamonds, they even forgot to sing cheerful songs. They just 
hated, envied, and feuded with each other. The very same nationalist ideology emphasizing the 
cult of the nation-state, which gave birth to post-Yugoslav ethno-clerical regimes, crippled them 
from the beginning. The seven smaller mutually feuding states, successors of Yugoslavia, have 
been unable to maintain Yugoslavia’s independent status and carry on its reputation and 
influence in international affairs earned during the Cold War. The post-Yugoslav dwarfs have 
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become client states and semi-colonial domains of the great powers—Russia, Turkey, and 
Germany—reviving imperial appetites in the Balkan region. The new Balkan states’ political 
sovereignty was reduced to spheres of folklore and international sport. Economic sovereignty 
was never established, meaning natural and economic resources have been quickly sold to 
foreign banks and largely foreign private capital. Serbia and Croatia, the two principal Balkan 
nationalist bullies, have national institutes for history and linguistics, national pilgrimage centers, 
national cathedrals and national churches paid by the state but not a single large national 
commercial bank. Furthermore, the cult of the state as the most sacred goal for which nationalist 
movements mobilized people to war, became a costly burden on new societies and economies 
threatening to bankrupt them. Taxpayers’ money fed the new corrupt elites and parasitic classes. 
These include ethno-clerical nationalist parties allied with clerical elites, oversized military 
forces and hundreds of thousands war veterans living on lavish pensions, and war veterans 
organized in political lobbies to back right-wing nationalist politics and to plot authoritarian coup 
d’ etats.  
While economies struggled and political corruption spread; history, myth, religion, and 
linguistics became priority topics in public discourse. Exhausting and absurd historical 
controversies, denial of war crimes and genocide, glorifying criminals as heroes, obsessions with 
“the negative other,” and the resentment caused by the unfair distribution of the socialist-era 
wealth and property have engendered moral relativism, disillusionment, and cynicism. To make 
the nationalist establishment even angrier, the former Yugoslavia seems to have continued life. 
The nostalgic cultures of memory thrive in subcultural and virtual spheres, and in a post-
Yugoslav diaspora, honoring Yugoslavia’s founding anti-fascist years in the Second World War, 
and the golden age of socialist modernization and international non-alignment from the 1960s to 
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1980s. In addition, the common language of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and Bosnians (without 
an official name it’s called “ours” by all) and the Yugo-nostalgic culture and memory continue to 
defy the invented segregation. Three decades later, the destroyed country seems revived as 
culture and memory connect people within the common space simply called “the region.”  
The post-Yugoslav nationalism is strikingly religious. As ethnic leaders show off the 
official religiosity, new churches and mosques have mushroomed across the region. According to 
the new national identities, all Serbs are presumed to be Christians of the Greek Orthodox 
tradition,  members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and unwavering believers in its mythical 
interpretations of history. The neighboring Croats are practicing Roman Catholics and must 
adhere to the Church’s interpretations of history, most importantly of the World War II, the 
communist era, and of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Likewise, Islam for Bosnian Muslims is 
both religion and nationality. Most importantly, the Bošniaks have to believe that the Ottoman 
rule in the Balkans was a blessing of a superior civilization rather than a brutal imperial 
conquest. Clerical elites are handsomely paid by the state. Religious instruction in public schools 
becomes de facto mandatory. Religious authorities take special spiritual and ideological care of 
the members of police and military forces—preparing them for holy wars and cleansing of alien 
faiths and cultures. School classes in earlier best-integrated ethnically mixed communities of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina have been segregated along ethnoreligious lines. Religious institutions 
influence educational and cultural policies and state-run media. Nationalist mythmaking is a 
substitute for objective historiography. The ethnoreligious hatred which poisoned multiethnic 
Yugoslavia has never subsided. The clerical elites who used to incite hate before and during the 
war never confessed to the crimes committed by members of their own group, and have not 
initiated interfaith and interethnic reconciliation, even of a purely ritual character.  
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Despite the post-Yugoslav regimes’ apotheosis of the new nations as triumphant and 
successful, an exodus of biblical proportions followed the wars of the 1990s. Instead of cheering 
the theatrical show of new nationhood without substance, millions of people chose to resettle in 
the West. From a population of more than 23 million, according to the last all-Yugoslav census 
of 1991, the number of permanent residents in the ex-YU space today is probably less than 20 
million. This exodus coupled with devastating demographic trends promises to resolve the 
Balkan conflict by natural causes. By the end of this century, the Serbs and the Croats—the two 
largest ethnic nations and the principal founders and destroyers of the common state, will face a 
near-extinction. Even if their ethnoreligious nationalists ever admitted to their responsibility for 
this outcome, the process will remain irreversible. 
Similar to Europe after the First World War, the European Union fears balkanization, i.e., 
the violent fragmentation of larger states into smaller mutually hostile and barely viable units. 
Historically, the most successful European nationalisms have been those that integrated and 
united smaller states, autonomous regions, and diverse regional cultures and peoples to 
successfully create larger nation-states. Thus for example, if Germany had not united several 
hundred small German states into the large German nation after the Peace of Westphalia, Europe 
would have looked like Central America, the Middle East, or the Balkans today. England, the 
Netherlands, France, and Italy—among others—have also become worldly and historically 
important nation-states thanks to the merging and integrating of autonomous regions, and the 
diverse regional cultures and peoples into large nation-states. Nationalism as an ideology of 
modernity, and progress presupposes integration and unification of smaller states into larger 
states. The larger and stronger states will then pursue further expansion, economic growth, and 
international competition. In addition, the western European nation-formation involved a leading 
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role of the most developed regions. In the Netherlands—Protestant Holland and the northern 
provinces in Germany’s case—it was again the Protestant north, in Britain it was industrialized 
England, and in Italy it was the northern regions, etc. Regarding the role of religion in this 
original Western European nation formation, the large successful nations have emphasized 
secularism, religious tolerance, and the principle of church and state separation. Some of them—
notably France, Germany, and Italy—even came into conflict with major religions and clerical 
ambitions asserting supremacy of the state.  
The nation-formation in the Balkans featured the opposite of the Western European 
precedent. Integrations and modernizing drives struggled and failed. The most backward regions 
played the leading roles, religion fused with ethnicity de-secularized national ideologies, and the 
nation-states became sacralized as mythical irrational fantasies with no rational developmental 
and modernization agendas. Accordingly, if the Western European nation-building experience is 
called nationalism, and if the Yugoslav project tried to follow this model, then the anti-Yugoslav 
ethnic separatism would not qualify as nationalism. Balkanization, and the specific Balkan type 
of nationalism, are actually some kind of antinationalism. Tribalism or ethnic particularism, 
sectarianism, provincialism, and the established concept of balkanization, all seem more 
appropriate terms than nationalism. Balkanization is the opposite of nationalism; it denotes 
disintegration and destruction driven by wild passions without a vison, and it results in barely 
viable states and problematic constructs of nationhood. 
Among these balkanizing nationalisms, the Serb-Orthodox, which is particularly 
ethnocentric and sectarian, has been the strongest and most influential in the Balkans. As such it 
has influenced and created in its own image the neighboring Croat-Catholic and Bosnian-Muslim 
ethnoreligious ‘nationalisms,’ not to mention Montenegrin, Macedonian, and Kosovar. 
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Ironically, the more they struggled to differ from each other, the more they looked the same, 
emulating the most hated and envied Serbs. 
As a result, when the recent balkanizing tendencies spread westward, the head of the 
Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis, warned in a 2014 interview that Western countries 
struggling with ethnic separatism such as Spain and the United Kingdom, must do all they can to 
avert “the tragedy of balkanization.” The struggling states of the postwar Balkans proved the 
pontiff right. A Bosnian columnist has recently passed the following message to separatists in 
Spain: “Look at us, Catalonia! Are you sure that you want to be like us!?”  
Seeking a wider socio-historic context in which the new Balkan ethnoreligious 
nationalism could possibly fit—while rejecting the ancient (religious and ethnic) hatreds thesis—
could be the phenomenon described as the “de-secularization of the world” since the late 20th 
century. The process is broad and complex, yet, for example, countries which after the Second 
World War experimented with ambitious social modernization emphasizing socialism, 
secularism, and integration across ethnic and religious barriers, (e.g. Tito’s Yugoslavia, Israel 
prior to 1967, Nehru’s India, Indonesia, Egypt, etc.), have experienced the religious nationalistic 
and anti-secularist backlash from the 1970s to the present. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, 
the resurgent religions since the 1970s had concealed the real agenda of the interethnic and 
sectarian feud behind the Cold War battle cry against “godless communism.”  In reality, the 
vengeful Yugoslav post-communist religions did not hate systemic Marxism as much as they 
hated the Titoist national ideology of Brotherhood and Unity, advancing interethnic harmony, 
ecumenical dialogue, and interfaith cooperation. Apparently, the ethno-clerical nationalists’ 
hatred of the idea of a peaceful multicultural and interfaith integration seems stronger than both 
the mutual animosity and fear of atheism.  
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In conclusion, there has been the noticeable influence of organized religion on recent 
nationalism beyond mere identity politics. Distrusted by early western nationalism, religion has 
proved a recyclable material. In our time, despite all the technological and scientific progress and 
numerous other secularizing factors, worldwide there are a number of states, nations, and 
regimes that can be described as theocratic, clericalist, religious-nationalistic, or strongly 
influenced by religion.  In the case of former Yugoslavia and its successor states, religions have 
begun their resistance to modernity as guardians of ethnic identities and resisters to 
secularization. They ended up as instigators and legitimizers of massive crimes, co-creators of 
problematic forms of nationhood, and virtual co-rulers of failed or struggling states. Even some 
religious scholars have to admit that the quality of spiritual and moral life of religious believers 
under communism might have been better if religion had been less opulent, public, and political, 
and if people overall had thought less dogmatically. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (FEBRUARY 2019) XXXIX, 1 50
